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Abstract 
This article aims at understanding to what extent European issues and actors are covered through a negative 
tone within the news coverage of the 2019 EP election campaign in Italy. We rely on an original dataset based 
on content analysis of the 50 days prior to the 2019 EP elections in four mainstream newspapers (n=3,943) 
and four mainstream TV newscasts (n=1,873). Our findings show that the media negativity is primarily associ-
ated with domestic politics, while all in all European politics is covered using a less negative tone. This general 
picture is the results of two differentiated patterns: newspapers are less negative towards both EU politics and 
EU and foreign political actors, while TV news are more negative towards EU and foreign political actors. 
1. Introduction 
s is well known, European elections have been defined as second-order elections. 
Reif and Schmitt argued in 1980 that this type of election is generally character-
ized by a high voter turnout, the punishment of incumbents, and greater 
expressive voting. As regards party campaigns and elections coverage, the main features 
refer to the more limited budget and the shorter duration of the campaign when com-
pared to national elections, the kind of candidate selected (not recruited from among the 
leaders of parties), and the constant presence within the campaign of national issues, or 
else European issues framed in a national perspective (Marsh 1998; Cayrol 1991; de 
Vreese, Lauf, and Peter, 2006a). Yet, it is also the case that this model is evolving (Schmitt 
2005; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011; Galpin and Trenz 2018; Roncarolo 2011). Certainly, af-
ter the Great Recession, the EU gained considerable salience within domestic debate for 
imposing austerity measures and (not) managing the migration issue (Hutter and Kriesi 
2019). In the same period, several national parties – both Europhile and Eurosceptic – 
have stressed the relevance of the EU within national political debates (Meijers 2017). In 
this context, the news media have become increasingly relevant not only as a source of 
information but also as an active player in the game of (de)legitimation of the EU. 
A 
European versus Domestic Politics 
 74 
In this regard, a well-established branch of literature has found that the news cover-
age of European Union (EU) politics plays a crucial role in connecting European citizens 
with institutions and in raising public awareness of EU politics. Banducci and Semetko 
(2003) found that EU news coverage affects turnout in European elections, while other 
scholars have shown a correlation between citizens’ support for future European integra-
tion and the features of news coverage on the EU (e.g. Maier & Rittberger, 2008; 
Vliegenthart et al., 2008). EU news coverage also contributes to enhancing the process of 
Europeanizing national public spheres (e.g. Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007) and strength-
ening the legitimacy of the EU institutions (e.g. Trenz, 2008).  
A second strand of scholars focus more specifically on the negative media coverage 
of EU-related issues and on their effects on citizens’ attitudes towards the EU. One con-
sistent finding, regarding journalism and news values in general, is that bad news is more 
newsworthy than good news (Soroka, 2014). This also applies to politics at both national 
and supranational level. In this perspective, the news media can play an active role in am-
plifying or restraining EU contestation (Statham & Trenz, 2013). Galpin and Trenz 
(2018), comparing news media coverage in the UK and Germany, found that the UK news 
demonstrates a strong negative bias towards EU polity, whereas in Germany EP debates 
focus more strongly on EU politics and policies and show a positive bias towards EU pol-
ity. Other scholars, looking at the effects of this type of coverage, have analysed the tone 
of EU news and found that exposure to negative evaluations of the EU leads citizens to be 
more supportive of Eurosceptic parties (De Vreese 2004; van Spanje & de Vreese 2014). 
This article examines mainstream media coverage of the 2019 EU elections, adopt-
ing the case of Italy as an illustration. These elections were the first test for the populist 
government led by the 5 Star Movement and the League. Both these parties are clearly not 
Europhile but rather, albeit with some differences, Eurosceptic. The 5 Star Movement has 
in the past adopted a pretty ambiguous approach by raising criticism against the EU but 
keeping their distance from the Eurosceptic parties once in Brussels (Franzosi et al. 
2015). On the contrary, the League – especially under the leadership of Matteo Salvini – 
shifted towards hard Euroscepticism, moving the traditional cleavage (and divide) from 
Rome to Brussels, blaming EU institutions for the bad economic situation (Albertazzi et 
al., 2018). As a consequence, EU elections have acquired greater importance than in the 
past. This article aims to understand to what extent European issues and actors are re-
ferred to in a negative tone within the news coverage of the 2019 EP election campaign. It 
allows a thorough understanding of the role of the mainstream media in the (de)legitima-
tion of the EU in a country affected by several controversies with the EU (among others, 
migration issues and public debt containment) and led by two Eurosceptic parties. 
For a long time, Italy was considered a Europhile country (Huysseune, 2010; Conti & 
Memoli, 2010, 2013). Since 2014, the situation has radically changed. While Eurosceptic 
parties did not reach 20% in 2009, they exceeded 50% of the votes in 20141. Italy further 
 
1 In the 2009 EP elections, the Eurosceptic parties were the Northern League (LN) and the Radical Left 
(SEL). In 2014, besides LN and SEL (renamed the ‘Tsipras List’ for the occasion), a further three parties 
openly joined the Eurosceptic side. On the right, Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI, Go Italy) ran a campaign 
under the slogan ‘More Italy in Europe, Less Europe in Italy’. In the same area, Fratelli d’Italia (FDI, 
Brothers of Italy), a Berlusconi ally, campaigned close to the Eurosceptic positions of Marine Le Pen. Fi-
nally, the most voted Eurosceptic party in the 2014 elections was the Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S, Five 
Star Movement), whose campaign was based on the request for a referendum on the Euro and a refusal of 
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evolved toward an EU-critical positioning in 2019 when Lega, M5S and FDI won almost 
58% of the votes cast. In this situation, where the two mainstream parties, Forza Italia (FI, 
Go Italy) and Partito Democratico (PD, Democratic Party), are marginalized, and no pro-
European voices are heard in the public debate, it is relevant to investigate the role of the 
Italian media system in counterposing or fostering the anti-EU narrative. 
In the light of the above, the article shows how the main Italian newscasts and news-
papers used a negative tone to cover domestic and European actors and themes, by 
investigating different patterns of Europeanization (Koopmans and Erbe 2004). In the 
section below, we discuss how literature has addressed this issue and, on this basis, we 
present our research questions. In section 2, we outline the research design, while in sec-
tion 3 we examine the coverage of the 2019 EP election campaign in Italy. Our findings 
suggest that TV and daily press present different patterns of negativity. Newspapers, in 
particular, appear more prone to using a negative tone when featuring politics. As con-
cerns the dualism between EU and domestic politics, Europe still benefits from a 
Europhile media coverage if compared with domestic politics, and this applies to both 
press and TV. Conversely, when the distinction between EU and domestic politics is 
viewed through the lens of political actors, we observe a radical difference between TV 
and press. EU political actors are indeed more likely to be covered negatively on TV news-
casts than in newspapers. Further differences can be identified when taking into account 
the dimensions of Europeanization, results suggesting that when the media cover the in-
teraction between EU and domestic politics there are higher chances of negative 
coverage. There is one exception: when Italian political actors approach EU institutions 
or EU representatives, TV newscasts tend to be less negative 
2. EU coverage on mainstream media 
In the past two decades, several scholars have focused their studies on media coverage of 
the EU. Analyses of media coverage of European politics have answered questions about 
the Europeanization of national public spheres (e.g. Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007) and 
contributed to our understanding of the democratic legitimacy of the EU institutions (e.g. 
Trenz, 2008, Savini, 2019). Findings show that irregular and limited news coverage could 
unfavourably influence public citizens' awareness of the EU and especially the relation-
ship between the representatives and the represented (Shephard, 1997). Regular 
coverage, on the contrary, would enhance opportunities for citizens to take note of EU ac-
tivities and foster trust in European institutions (Norris, 2000; Nardis, 2015). 
The development of the European public sphere is challenging journalism cultures 
and practices; despite country-based differences the EU has indeed become a common 
issue for journalists (Kunelius 2008). In this respect, Pfetsch et al. (2008), for example, 
found that the press plays a crucial role in the Europeanization of national public spheres, 
and in particular some countries seem to share similar approaches when dealing with EU 
issues as a consequence of a similar degree of involvement in the EU integration project 
(i.e. the press of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain share a similar point 
of view on EU issues when compared with the UK or Switzerland). Besides the functional 
 
the restrictive policies imposed by the EU (e.g. the inclusion of the fiscal compact and balanced budget 
principle in the Italian Constitution). 
European versus Domestic Politics 
 76 
relationship with the EU, press coverage is affected also by the organizational infrastruc-
ture and the editorial policies setting the allocation of resources for EU newsgathering, 
and by the journalistic culture as well. Similarly, Cornia et al. (2008) suggest that a Euro-
pean journalistic culture is developing, but the domestic perspective still prevails and 
national relevance remains the core criterion for news selection. Similar results are found 
by Preston (2009), underlining that EU issues are still largely addressed and covered 
through domestic interpretative schemes.  
News about the EU is not traditionally widespread in mainstream media and some 
differences can be found between media types. While quality newspapers usually tend to 
cover European affairs (Trenz, 2004; Machill, Beiler & Fischer, 2006), EU news on tele-
vision has been limited, irregular, and mainly focused on domestic issues or actors (e.g. 
de Vreese, Peter & Semetko, 2001; Peter & de Vreese, 2004; Meyer, 2005; Boomgaarden 
et al., 2010). Starting from 2008, the economic and Euro crises began to change this ap-
proach to covering the EU (e.g. Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2012). At the same time, another 
series of issues, including humanitarian intervention, common defence, immigration 
policy and terrorism, are becoming more transnational, potentially contributing to the 
Europeanization of national public spheres (e.g. Koopmans, 2004; de Vreese & Kandyla, 
2009; Kantner, 2011). 
Scholars have mainly addressed the study of European Union news coverage by tak-
ing into account several dimensions, such as the visibility of EU news (e.g. Boomgaarden 
et al., 2010), the degree of Europeanization (or domestication) (e.g. Koopmans, 2007; 
McQuail & Bergsma, 1983; Peter & de Vreese 2004), the tone of the news regarding Euro-
pean integration, and the framing of EU affairs (e.g. de Vreese et al., 2006). 
As clearly illustrated in several studies by Boomgaarden, de Vreese, and colleagues 
(Boomgaarden et al., 2010; Boomgaarden et al., 2013; Schuck & de Vreese, 2011), the vis-
ibility of the EU in the news is relevant, since it provides citizens with 'information about 
the issues at stake and cues them about the importance of European Parliament elections' 
(Boomgaarden et al., 2013: 611).  
In the light of the second-order elections thesis (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, 2005), 
the Europeanness of the news, namely the extent to which EU news is (or is not) domesti-
fied (Boomgaarden et al., 2013; Boomgaarden & de Vreese, 2016), has been assessed 
through different dimensions. Europeanization has been defined as a vertical or horizontal 
process: vertical Europeanization ‘consists of communicative linkages between the na-
tional and the European level’, and horizontal Europeanization ‘consists of communicative 
linkages between different member states’ (Koopmans & Erbe, 2004: 101).  
By using both of these dimensions, Schuck & De Vreese (2011: 289) showed that news-
papers are still more important as agents of Europeanization than television news; the 
quality press and public television are more European in focus than their commercial coun-
terparts. Mainly focusing on the vertical dimension, Boomgaarden et al. (2013: 623–624) 
examined the prominence of EU actors in news coverage and found that when there is in-
creasing elite conflict, there is less of a European focus in the news. This also applies to 
negativity among the political elites: the more negative, the less European (or vice versa).  
In light of the above, we investigate whether and to what extent the coverage of Euro-
pean politics and actors differentiates from the coverage of domestic politics and actors. We 
focus in particular on the negativity dimension, which is a recurrent element in the 
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coverage of politics in general (Lengauer et al. 2011). No study has so far focused specifically 
on the negative media coverage of European politics. Therefore, we do not have clear expec-
tations but have structured our analysis around four different research questions. 
A preliminary question concerns possible differences between newscasts and newspa-
pers in the coverage of politics, in general. As mentioned above, we know that some 
differences emerge in terms of visibility but, to our knowledge, there are no studies that ac-
count for systemic differences between the two media regarding negativity. We therefore 
wondered:  
RQ1: Does the level of negativity vary between TV and newspapers? 
On the basis of this preliminary RQ, we developed a further set of queries aimed to 
better clarify the main drivers of negativity within the two media types. The aim is thus to 
compare the negative tones of TV and the press by focusing on the distinction between 
domestic and EU politics at different levels. Indeed, we found expectations that domestic 
politics is more relevant (in terms of visibility and space) than European politics, but 
there are no clear indications as to the patterns that a negative tone follows when covering 
the former or the latter. Similar findings concern political actors: domestic actors are 
more salient within national public debates, but no clear expectations are found regarding 
media negativity. In this regard, our questions read as follow: 
RQ2: Does the level of negativity differ when European or domestic politics are cov-
ered? 
RQ3: Does the level of negativity differ when European or domestic political actors 
are covered? 
Finally, literature shows that the Europeanization of public debates involves the cov-
erage of different dimensions of the European integration process. Our last question, 
therefore, wonders whether there are different probabilities of negative coverage being 
associated with vertical and horizontal Europeanization: 
RQ4: Does the level of negativity differ according to different ways to cover Euro-
pean politics? 
3. Methods 
3.1 Sample 
This study investigates the Italian media coverage of the 2019 EP elections. Our research 
questions are addressed by mean of a dataset including all news items focusing on polit-
ical issues published or broadcast by the main Italian press and TV media outlets during 
the seven weeks before the EP elections (7 April–24 May 2019). The unit of analysis was 
the news story and it was studied through a human content analysis carried out by three 
supervised coders. The data collection comprehends five newspapers and five TV news-
casts that were selected according to two different criteria: the readership/audience and 
the outlet’s political leaning2. Therefore, among the most widespread Italian 
 
2 The outlets’ political leanings were identified by referring to individual media diet and voting behaviour 
in the 2018 General Elections by relying on Itanes 2018 survey data (Itanes, 2018; Roncarolo and 
Mancini, 2018). 
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newspapers, we considered Corriere della Sera and La Stampa as less-politically-ori-
ented/neutral outlets, while Il Giornale and La Repubblica were included as 
representatives of, respectively, right- and left-wing views. Finally, Il Fatto Quotidiano 
was covered by our analysis since its political leaning appears closer to the Movimento 5 
Stelle. As regards TV, the evening editions of the following newscasts were examined: 
TG1, TG2, TG3, TG5 and La7 News. Also in this case, TG1 and La7 News were selected as 
less-politically-oriented/neutral newscasts, while the others account for different polit-
ical areas. More precisely, TG2 was considered because it most reflects the government’s 
political views, while TG3 and TG5 were included in our study for their traditional close-
ness to, respectively, the centre-left and centre-right positions.  
For newspapers, all political news items published on the first page and recalled in 
internal pages were coded, while news items focusing on EU-related issues were all in-
cluded in the data collection, regardless of their position within the newspaper. As 
regards TV, all political news items broadcast were coded. The final dataset includes 
5,816 news items; in detail: 1,873 TV news items and 3,943 press news items. 
3.2. Variables3 
GENERAL TONE OF THE STORY: NEGATIVE TONE. Our dependent variable (DV) accounts for 
the negative tone of media coverage. Following Lengauer et al. (2011), indicators of neg-
ative tone were found in those news items containing elements referring to (i.e.) crisis, 
disaster, negative outlook, conflict, defeat, fiasco The DV was derived from a categorical 
one, which according to the coding procedure aimed to distinguish between news items 
providing a negative, positive, balanced or neutral tone. Then, for the sake of simplicity, 
it was recoded to isolate the news items showing negative tones against all the other news 
items framed by positive, neutral or balanced tones. 
MEDIA TYPE AND OUTLETS. The first research question (RQ1), exploring the negative 
bias in press and TV coverage, was addressed by means of a dichotomous variable (IV1) 
distinguishing between news items reported by press (=1) and news items broadcast by 
TV newscasts (=0). Furthermore, we also investigated possible differences in the likeli-
hood of negative tone among the outlets analysed. Indeed, according to the criteria 
adopted for selecting the outlets, we could rely on a sample reflecting different political 
leanings. This allowed us to clarify whether there were ideological elements underpin-
ning the outlet patterns of covering political issues. We investigate this dimension 
through a set of dummy variables identifying each of the ten media outlets analysed 
(IVs2). 
EU POLITICS VS DOMESTIC POLITICS. According to RQ2, within a general climate of opin-
ion characterized by citizens’ increasing criticism of  the European Integration project, 
we aim to assess if Italian media outlets contributed to this climate of opinion by covering 
European-related issues and political actors in a negative way, or whether EU politics 
still benefits from Europhile coverage (Bobba and Seddone, 2018). With this purpose in 
mind, we classified the news stories according to two main categories: those dealing with 
domestic politics and those referring to European politics. We intended this latter 
 
3 Coding instructions are reported in Appendix. 
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dimension as all the references to EU institutions, EU policies or EU political actors. In 
addition, when the story was devoted to issues relating to other EU member states it was 
also identified as European Politics. Conversely, all the stories covering the Italian polit-
ical debate or Italian political actors were categorized as Domestic Politics. We derived, 
then, a dichotomous variable scoring 1 if news stories focused on European Politics and 
coded as 0 when Domestic Politics was addressed within the news item (IV3). 
POLITICAL ACTORS. RQ3 examines the impact of political actors’ visibility on negative 
bias within media coverage. The presence of political actors within the news story was 
detected by mean of a categorical variable accounting for the main Italian political lead-
ers as well as any possible reference to EU or foreign political actor in news items. For 
each news item, coders were asked to register up to five political actors. These data were 
then recoded into a set of five different dummy variables (IVs4) indicating, respectively, 
whether the story presented references to: Berlusconi, Di Maio, Salvini, Zingaretti or EU 
political actors. 
EUROPEANIZATION. The fourth research question (RQ4) addresses the dimension of Eu-
ropeanization. It is meant as a process of reciprocal connections between the EU political 
space and the domestic one. The contribution of Koopmans and Erbe (2004) appears 
fundamental. In particular, their theoretical framework identifies two dynamics of in-
teractions between the national and the EU public spheres: Vertical and Horizontal. 
Vertical Europeanization is intended as the communicative linkages between the na-
tional and European political space. The Bottom-Up variant refers to the case of national 
actors directly addressing European institutions, European political actors or referring 
to EU policy issues. The Top-Down variant of Vertical Europeanization follows the in-
verse flow, i.e., the case of European actors addressing national actors, or intervening in 
domestic political debate by emphasizing common European issues and interests. Hori-
zontal Europeanization, instead, pertains to the connections between the public spheres 
of EU members states. The Weak variant of Horizontal Europeanization occurs when na-
tional media coverage reports issues related to the national political space of other EU 
member states. The Strong variant of Horizontal Europeanization concerns instead di-
rect communicative linkages between two member states’ political spaces. It could take 
place, for example, when politicians of a given country directly approach political actors 
of another EU member state.  
Empirically, the Vertical Europeanization dimension was covered by two dummy 
variables detecting whether the news item provides reference, respectively, to Top-
Down and Bottom-Up Vertical Europeanization (IVs5). Similarly, two dummy variables 
identified the news items referring, respectively, to Strong and Weak Horizontal Euro-
peanization (IVs6). 
3.3. Models 
The research questions leading our study were addressed by mean of four logit models, 
testing the likelihood of a negative tone in media coverage (DV). According to RQ1, in 
order to detect differences between media types, we ran separated models for Press and 
TV. Model 1 and Model 2 include as independent variables (a) the set of media outlets 
reporting the news story, (b) the dummy variable testing the reference to EU contents 
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(institutions, policy issues or political actors), and finally (c) the dichotomous variable 
accounting for the reference to EU political actors. Models 3 and 4 extend this analysis 
by introducing the set of dummy variables identifying references to Berlusconi, Di Maio, 
Salvini, and Zingaretti along with the dichotomous variable referring to the presence of 
EU political actors. In addition, these two models also include the dimension of Europe-
anization, by testing the dummy variables detecting Bottom-Up Vertical 
Europeanization, Top-Down Vertical Europeanization, Weak Horizontal Europeaniza-
tion and Strong Horizontal Europeanization. Again, the two models distinguish between 
TV and press media. Table 1 shows descriptives of variables included in the two models. 
Table 1. Descriptives of the variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Type of media (Press vs TV) 5816 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Corriere della Sera 5816 0.14 0.34 0 1 
La Repubblica 5816 0.12 0.33 0 1 
La Stampa 5816 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Il Giornale 5816 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Il Fatto Quotidiano 5816 0.15 0.36 0 1 
TG1 5816 0.07 0.25 0 1 
TG2 5816 0.08 0.27 0 1 
TG3 5816 0.07 0.26 0 1 
TG5 5816 0.05 0.22 0 1 
TG La7 news 5816 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Reference to EU or Foreign Political Actors 5816 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Reference to Berlusconi 5816 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Reference to Di Maio 5816 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Reference to Salvini 5816 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Reference to Zingaretti 5816 0.08 0.28 0 1 
EU news stories 5816 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Bottom-Up Vertical Europeanization  2103 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Top-Down Vertical Europeanization  2103 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Weak Horizontal Europeanization 2689 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Strong Horizontal Europeanization 2689 0.15 0.36 0 1 
4. Results 
We introduce our findings by providing some descriptive analyses illustrating the pat-
terns of negative tone within our sample. Precisely, Table 2 shows the proportion of 
negative tone among the media outlets included in this study4. First of all, we observe 
that Italian media coverage of the EP election campaign presents high levels of negative 
tone, especially if compared with 2014 media coverage of the EP elections (Roncarolo 
2019; Bobba and Seddone 2018). In total, 39.4% of the news stories analysed present ele-
ments of negative tone. This applies generally to all media outlets analysed, but it should 
be noted that negativity varies according to media type. Indeed, newspapers present a 
 
4 Table 1a reported in the Appendix provides details about the distribution of negative, positive and neu-
tral tone. In general, among Italian media outlets a neutral/balanced tone prevails when addressing 
politics and related issues. However, there are some significant differences. In particular, as concerns 
media outlets like Il Giornale and TG5 – both owned by Berlusconi – the portion of neutral/balanced tone 
is quite low when compared with other outlets, while a negative frame prevails for depicting politics. In 
addition, it should be noted that a positive tone is actually extremely marginal for all the media outlets 
included in this study. 
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higher quota of news stories using a negative tone (42.8%) while TV outlets seem to be 
less inclined to cover political issues negatively; nevertheless, the portion of negativity 
remains pretty high since it concerns more than one third of TV news items. Further 
differences emerge among outlets composing our sample. As concerns the press, news 
items characterized by a negative tone range from 34.3% for Corriere della Sera to 56.8% 
for Il Giornale while the other press outlets register portions of negative news items close 
to 40%. Regarding TV, instead, TG1 has the lowest quota of news stories framed in a neg-
ative tone (24.4%), while TG5 seems to be the outlet that covers politics with greater 
negativity: almost one out of two news stories is depicted in a negative tone. 
Table 2. Negative tone in media and single outlets  
 News item (N total) Negative news item (N) Negative news item (%) 
Daily Press 3,943 1,687 42.8 
Corriere della Sera 787 270 34.3 
la Repubblica 706 291 41.2 
La Stampa 773 300 38.8 
Il Giornale 808 459 56.8 
Il Fatto Quotidiano 869 367 42.2 
Newscast 1,873 609 32.5 
TG1 393 96 24.4 
TG2 451 157 34.8 
TG3 431 124 28.8 
TG5 305 145 47.5 
La7 News 293 87 29.7 
Total 5,816 2,296 39.5 
 
Table 3 details the negativity of media coverage when the news story presents refer-
ences to political actors5. We can see from these figures that, in general, when news items 
include EU or foreign political actors, the portion of negative tone is lower than media 
coverage focusing on Italian political leaders. Only one news story out of three is negative 
when referring to EU or foreign politicians. Conversely, negativity increases when the 
media cover Italian political actors. The percentage of negative news items ranges from 
38.6% when Silvio Berlusconi is covered to 51.3% of negative tone when the story presents 
references to Nicola Zingaretti. Interestingly, the share of negativity referring to Luigi 
Di Maio and Matteo Salvini is quite similar for the two leading exponents of the coalition 
government (resp. 45.5% and 42.5%). 
Table 3. Negative tone and political actors 
 News item (N total) Negative news item (N) Negative news item (%) 
Berlusconi 453 175 38.6 
Di Maio 1,333 606 45.5 
Salvini 2,161 918 42.5 
Zingaretti 483 248 51.3 
EU-Foreign Political Actors 1,141 366 32 
 
5 Table 2a in the Appendix provides details about the general tone for political leaders. Data show that with 
the sole exception of Nicola Zingaretti, the negative tone prevails for all political leaders – including the 
EU/foreign political actors. The positive frame is also in this case extremely marginal, ranging from 2.9% 
for Zingaretti and 7.8% for EU/foreign political actors. 
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Table 4 shows instead the patterns of negative tone among news items focusing on 
the EU. Data suggest that media coverage tends to be more negative when addressing is-
sues relating to domestic politics. This seems to confirm the idea of a Europhile attitude 
among Italian media outlets. The political debate among domestic politics catalyses the 
negativity of Italian media outlets where almost one out of two news stories presents a 
negative tone (46.6). Conversely, the percentage of negative news items decreases when 
the EU is covered (31.24%). However, taking into account the modalities of Europeaniza-
tion, data indicate some differences. Indeed, as regards Horizontal Europeanization, the 
portion of negative news items is pretty similar: about 30% for both strong or weak vari-
ants. On the contrary, things appear slightly different when considering Vertical 
Europeanization. While one third of the stories presenting Bottom-Up elements are 
framed within a negative tone, as regards the Top-Down variant the tone of the coverage 
appears far more negative (37%). 
Table 4. Negative tone and European vs domestic politics 
 News item 
(N total) 
Negative 
news item (N) 
Negative 
news item (%) 
News items with references to domestic politics 3,127 1,456 46.6 
News items with references to European politics 2,689 840 31.2 
Bottom-Up Vertical Europeanization 1,243 369 29.7 
Top-Down Vertical Europeanization 303 113 37.3 
Weak Horizontal Europeanization 837 246 29.4 
Strong Horizontal Europeanization 398 124 31.1 
Total 5,816 2,296 39.5 
 
Although these are preliminary results, some interpretative cues can already be 
drawn. In the first instance, even within a negative media coverage context, Europe and 
its political actors seem to benefit from a benevolent media attitude. If domestic politics 
is covered more frequently with negative tones and frame elements, when dealing with 
issues relating to the EU the media moderate the negative tones. Furthermore, it is pos-
sible to identify a substantial difference between press and TV. The newspapers analysed 
are all characterized by prominent negativity, assuming much higher proportions than 
TV outlets. However, when figures are observed in more detail, some dynamics emerge 
clearly. The European theme is, in fact, treated in different ways by the Italian media. In 
particular, when the EU institutions directly approach the domestic political space, 
meaning they intervene in the national political debate by raising European interests, 
values or rules, the media show less indulgence and the share of negative news items 
grows more significant.    
These bivariate analyses have to be integrated by multivariate analyses testing these 
dimensions and measuring their contribution to negative bias in media coverage during 
the last EP election campaign in Italy. Taken all together, indeed, these elements of me-
dia coverage have a different effect on the probability of negative media coverage. 
When we look at the models presented in Table 5, these patterns appear clearer. 
Models 1 and 2, indeed, confirm the evidence that has already emerged from descriptive 
analyses. As regards the press (Model 1), where the Corriere della Sera is the reference 
category, all media outlets present positive and significant coefficients, meaning that 
they are all associated with a higher likelihood of negative media coverage.  
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Table 5. Drivers of Negative Tone on Press and TV coverage 
VARIABLES 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
PRESS Negative 
Tone 
TV Negative 
Tone 
PRESS Negative 
Tone 
TV Negative 
Tone 
PRESS (ref. cat. Corriere della sera)     
la Repubblica 
1.376***  1.520** - 
(0.151)  (0.277)  
La Stampa 
1.259**  1.267 - 
(0.135)  (0.230)  
Il Giornale 
2.465***  2.464*** - 
(0.260)  (0.438)  
Il Fatto Quotidiano 
1.262**  1.481** - 
(0.131)  (0.277)  
TV (ref. cat. Tg1)     
TG2 
 1.692*** - 2.878*** 
 (0.262)  (0.914) 
TG3 
 1.350* - 1.429 
 (0.217)  (0.480) 
TG5 
 2.926*** - 4.758*** 
 (0.486)  (1.603) 
La 7 News 
 1.353* - 1.367 
 (0.237)  (0.495) 
EU/foreign Political Actor 
0.701*** 2.052*** 0.598*** 1.775** 
(0.0702) (0.288) (0.0879) (0.420) 
Berlusconi 
  0.438*** 2.072*** 
  (0.0881) (0.573) 
Di Maio 
  1.528*** 1.088 
  (0.228) (0.301) 
Salvini 
  1.185 1.380 
  (0.162) (0.338) 
Zingaretti 
  0.541*** 5.057*** 
  (0.120) (1.225) 
EU politics 
0.513*** 0.552***   
(0.0393) (0.0636)   
Bottom-Up Vertical Europeanization 
  0.865 0.468*** 
  (0.103) (0.0976) 
Top-Down Vertical Europeanization 
  1.417** 1.830** 
  (0.224) (0.554) 
Weak Horizontal Europeanization 
  0.952 2.509*** 
  (0.184) (0.848) 
Strong Horizontal Europeanization 
  1.333* 0.780 
  (0.223) (0.250) 
Constant 
0.769*** 0.349*** 0.369*** 0.103*** 
(0.0633) (0.0438) (0.0596) (0.0328) 
Observations 3,943 1,873 1,472 631 
Notes: SE in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
On the contrary, news items focusing on EU-related issues are less likely to be 
framed within a negative tone, and the same applies for news stories referring to EU or 
foreign political actors. When we move to observe these patterns on TV (Model 2) some-
thing changes. Here we used TG1 as the reference category. Even in this case, odds 
rations associated with TV newscasts are all positive and significant, signalling that their 
news items increase the likelihood of a negative tone in media coverage. In addition, EU-
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related issues are, also in this case, less likely to be covered in a negative tone. However, 
when it comes to assess whether the EU political actors act as drivers of a negative tone 
in media coverage, the coefficients are positive. Indeed, compared to the press, TV news-
casts are more likely to frame negatively stories referring to EU politicians. 
Models 3 and 4 enlarge this analysis by including two elements: the different vari-
ants of Europeanization illustrated above and the differentiated contribution of Italian 
political leaders. Model 3 focuses on the press. In this case, we observe that media outlets 
still maintain their effect in increasing the likelihood of negative coverage, with the sole 
exception of La Stampa. On the other hand, if we consider Model 4, the TV outlets show 
different patterns. Only TG2 and TG5 are associated with positive and significant odds 
ratios which are far higher than in Model 2, confirming they are drivers of negativity. In 
general, it is worth noting that elements of political parallelism could be identified if tak-
ing into account coefficients from the two media outlets owned by Berlusconi (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004; Mancini, 2008). We found, indeed that they are both characterized by a 
far higher likelihood of increasing negativity coverage during the election campaign. 
This is a result of the position taken by these outlets, which basically acted as the opposi-
tion to the government (and the former ally, Salvini, in particular) while attacking the 
left-wing parties as well. 
Differences between press and TV remain prominent even when considering the 
dimension of political actors. While within press coverage the presence of EU or foreign 
political actors reduces the chances of negative coverage, TV shows the opposite result. 
In this case, news items are more likely to be framed by negative elements. Italian polit-
ical actors are also differentiated. As regards the press, Berlusconi, indeed, is associated 
with significant coefficients proving a lower probability of negativity. The same applies 
to Zingaretti. Only Di Maio, according to our findings, boosts the likelihood of a negative 
tone in media coverage. Again, the picture changes with Model 4, focusing on the TV 
sample. Regardless of whether they are domestic or EU, all political actors are more 
likely to increase the likelihood of a negative tone. Only Di Maio and Salvini disconfirm 
this pattern, with no significant odds ratio. These patterns could appear as counterintu-
itive. Indeed, given the Eurosceptic claims from both M5S and League, one could have 
expected that the visibility of the two leaders contributed to increasing the likelihood of 
a negative tone in media coverage. However, according to some previous research, the 
Italian media tend to mitigate negativity driven by Eurosceptic political leaders by coun-
terbalancing the negative frame relating to their positions with a neutral or even positive 
frame on the EU that results in a more balanced general tone. Furthermore, these coef-
ficients appear quite coherent with bivariate analyses (see Figure 1a in Appendix) 
showing that on TV both Salvini and Di Maio present a lower degree of negative tone 
compared with other leaders.  
Finally, distinguishing between variants of Europeanization, we found interesting 
results. While in Models 1 and 2, EU-related issues were found less likely to be covered in 
a negative tone, the introduction of variables relating to the four variants of Europeani-
zation determines substantial differences between the two media. Within the press sub-
sample, only Top-Down Vertical Europeanization and Strong Horizontal Europeaniza-
tion are found to be significant and positively associated with the DV. Conversely, as 
pertains to TV, a negative tone is more likely when stories refer to Top-Down Vertical 
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Europeanization and Strong Horizontal Europeanization. On the other hand, when na-
tional political actors approach EU-related issues, the likelihood of a negative tone 
decreases. 
5. Conclusions 
Our study aimed to investigate the drivers of negativity within Italian media coverage 
during the 2019 EP Election campaign. Italy offers a privileged angle for addressing this 
issue. On the one hand, Italian politics is going through a shift in climate of opinion on 
the EU. The country was traditionally considered Europhile, but the success of populist 
parties – now in government – criticising the EU integration process and endorsing na-
tionalist views, indicate that Eurosceptic views are becoming prominent among Italian 
parties. On the other hand, the media have usually held a supportive attitude towards the 
EU. Indeed, while media coverage of politics is in general characterized by a negative 
tone, where the elements of conflict and negativity prevail, the EU institutions and po-
litical actors have traditionally benefited from a less negative tone in the media. In other 
words, the media have often acted as moderators of criticism towards the EU by temper-
ing their usual tendency to negativity in covering political issues. 
Our study relied on an original dataset derived from a human content analysis car-
ried out on news items reported by five newspapers and five TV newscasts during the five 
weeks preceding the EP elections. Our results contribute to a better understanding of the 
processes of development of the European public sphere, and we identify some interest-
ing patterns concerning the Italian case. However, we are aware of some limitations. 
First of all, we should underline that our data may present some weaknesses due to the 
news item selection. Indeed, as concerns the press, the sample includes all news items 
focusing on the EU regardless of their position within the outlet (front page and internal 
pages), while news items focusing on domestic politics were included in the sample only 
when reported on the first page. On the contrary, as regards TV coverage, we took into 
account all political news items broadcast. On the one hand, this choice may entail a 
problem of comparability between press and TV; on the other hand, our data may suffer 
from overrepresentation of EU visibility in the press. For future studies, this issue will be 
addressed by re-defining the research design and including, for the press, all political 
news. Nonetheless, given that the purpose of the article was to clarify the dynamics of 
negativity in media coverage and the relationship with Europeanization patterns, the 
data provided still offer an interesting report on the dynamics of Europeanization during 
the 2019 European Election campaign in Italy. Secondly, we acknowledge that some re-
sults could be further strengthened if we included in our research design a qualitative 
dimension addressing the peculiarities of journalistic cultures characterizing the single 
outlets included in our analysis. This would allow us to differentiate outlets according to 
their editorial policy and organizational structure as pertains to the EU, since literature 
found these elements to be relevant to understanding the dynamics of the Europeaniza-
tion of public debate.  
Given the peculiarities of the Italian media system, we organized our research ques-
tions by addressing in particular whether press and TV may be characterized by different 
patterns of negativity within their coverage during the election campaign. In this regard, 
we observed that newspapers tended more to add a negative tone to political news stories, 
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while portions of negativity within TV appeared more limited. Furthermore, we also 
identified diverse attitudes among the outlets included in our study. These differences 
could be understood by taking into account the parallelism characterizing the Italian me-
dia system. Indeed, we found the higher quota of negative news items within the 
coverage provided by Il Giornale and TG5, which are both owned by the Berlusconi fam-
ily. As a result of the crisis within the party, the poor results obtained in the 2018 General 
Elections and the marginal role played within the centre-right area, the two media out-
lets engaged in a very negative and critical coverage, attacking both the left opposition 
and the coalition in government in an attempt to mobilize Forza Italia supporters. On the 
contrary, media outlets such as Corriere della Sera and TG1 confirm their more neutral 
approach to covering politics.  
The distinction between press and TV was explored also with regard to the other re-
search questions leading this study. We investigated whether and to what extent the 
distinction between EU and domestic politics may affect the negative media bias. Two 
main considerations emerge from our study. 
First of all, without much surprise, we observed that EU politics benefits from a lower 
likelihood of negative coverage compared to domestic politics. In other words, the national 
Italian political debate catalyses media negativity, and this applies to both press and TV. 
However, when we move to the dimension of political actors, the picture is more nuanced, 
showing net differences between newspapers and TV newscasts. In this case, indeed, the 
press confirms its moderation in the use of a negative tone when covering EU political ac-
tors, while on TV the dynamic is reversed, meaning that politicians from EU institutions or 
from other EU member states are more likely to be covered in a negative tone.  
Secondly, as concerns Europeanization, we observed that the interplay between EU 
and Italian politics is more likely to be framed in a negative tone when EU political actors 
intervene directly within the Italian political debate by raising European interests (i.e. 
threatening sanctions in the event of disregarding EU treaties or agreements). More in-
terestingly, when the Bottom-Up Vertical Europeanization variant is addressed within 
media coverage, TV media are less likely to adopt a negative tone. In other words, when 
Italian politics addresses EU politics, TV tends to change its approach. This is not found 
within the press sample of news stories. Also as regards Horizontal Europeanization, 
press and TV are differentiated, the strong variant being significant only within the 
press and the weak one significant only within TV.  
All things considered, it seems that while the press have adopted a negative attitude 
towards politics, expressing criticism towards domestic politics rather than EU political 
space, TV shows some signs of adapting to a new climate of opinion. TV media outlets 
moderate their negativity against domestic politics when compared to the press. But 
within their coverage they tend more to frame EU political actors negatively in particu-
lar, while they temper their criticism when domestic actors approach EU institutions. 
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Appendix: codebook 
General tone of the story 
What is the overall tone of the news item? Does the report convey primarily a positive, 
negative, balanced or neutral impression of politics, political records, conditions or 
views? 
1 = predominantly negative tone  
2 = predominantly positive tone 
3 = balanced/ambivalent 
0 = neutral/not applicable 
Instructions: indications of a negative tone are when the story is framed as political failure, fiasco, dis-
aster, crisis, frustration, collapse, flop, denial, rejection, neglect, default, deterioration, resignation, 
scepticism, threats, cynicism, defeatism or disappointment. Indications of a positive tone are depic-
tions of political success, problem solutions, achievement, improvement, advance, prosperity, 
accomplishment, enthusiasm, hope, benefit, gain, sustainability, gratification or accomplishment. If a 
report does not reflect indications of a negative or positive tone, then it should be coded as ‘neutral’.  
EU and domestic politics 
Does the news item contain relevant references to Europe (EU or any other EU coun-
try/political actor apart from Italy)? 
1= Yes, reference to EU (in general or single institution) 
2= Yes, reference to other EU country/political actor 
0= no reference to Europe 
Instructions: Europe is meant as a single institution, as EU issues, as EU policies as well as other EU 
countries. Please note that code 2 should be applied only in residual cases, namely only other EU country 
references and not EU institutions. Any reference to Brexit should be coded as 1. Any reference to EU 
parliamentary elections should be coded as 1. 
Vertical Europeanization: Bottom Up 
Does the news item include references to national actors addressing EU actors or making 
claims on EU issues/policies (general or specific)? 
0= no 
1 = yes 
999= NA 
Instructions: EU issues and policies should be addressed from a European perspective. For example, 
references to the EU election campaign or alliances at domestic level are not to be considered as an EU 
issue. On the contrary, when the discussion focuses on alliances within the EU Parliament it should be 
considered as an EU issue. Euro-crisis, Schengen, Lisbon Treaty are to be considered as EU issues. 
Vertical Europeanization: Top Down 
Does the news item include references to EU actors intervening in the domestic debate 
of any EU country in the name of common European/EU interests? 
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0= no 
1 = yes 
999= NA 
Instructions: for example, code 1 to be applied for news items where, for example, Draghi/Junker/Ta-
jani (or EU commissioners) intervene on Greek debt crisis. 
Horizontal Europeanization: Weak 
Does the news item cover the political debate in another country?  
0= no 
1 = yes 
999= NA 
Instructions: code 1 to be applied for news items focusing on other EU member states and their issues 
(i.e. Brexit, Gilets Jaunes…) 
Horizontal Europeanization: Strong 
Does the news item cover one political actor (from any EU country) speaking about is-
sues or with actors related to another EU country?  
0= no 
1 = yes 
999= NA 
Instruction: code 1 to be applied when an actor from a member state addresses or refers to actors or is-
sues related to another member state or even participating in public debates in another country (i.e. 
Merkel commenting on Gilets Jaunes; Di Maio speaking about Brexit, Orban commenting on Italian 
government) 
 
 
 
